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The three major security crises in the last decade in Japan- the response to the Gulf War, 
the earthquake in Kobe, and the Sarin chemical attack on Tokyo subway lines- provided the major 
turning points of Japanese security policy of the post cold war era. These events have also greatly 
affected Japanese fiscal policy and politics. 
The lessons from the failed attempt to send Self Defense Forces to the Gulf led to the act 
of allowing the SDFs’ participation in international peacekeeping operations and the new 
Guideline for “the situation in areas surrounding Japan”. The new political coalition which was 
formed to pass the tax increases in order to finance the Gulf War paved the way to the era of 
coalition governments in the 1990s and today. The earthquake in Kobe and the Sarin chemical 
attack made the Japanese people realize the importance of the SDFs in times of catastrophic 
events. 
 These events, combined with the changes in the international situation, led to the revision 
of the National Defense Program Outline. These catastrophic events also led to the strengthening 
of the prime minister’s office and some improvements of the law enforcement system. The 
“construction bonds” principle for fiscal policy was finally broken on the occasion of the Kobe 
earthquake, and the issuance of government bonds has been accelerated since then.  
All of these changes relate to the current response of the Koizumi Cabinet to the recent 
terrorist attacks in America and the Japanese budget deficit.   
As to the future of both security policy and fiscal policy, the preparedness of the Japanese 





The Gulf War, the earthquake in Kobe, and the Sarin chemical attack on Tokyo subway 
lines were the major challenges to Japanese security in the last decade. These crises actually 
provided the major turning points of Japanese security policy of the post cold war era. These 
events also greatly affected Japanese fiscal policy and domestic party politics. All of these changes 
relate to the current policies of the Koizumi Cabinet in response to the September 11 terrorist 
attacks and the Japanese budget deficit.   
This paper, by comparing the situation in the cold war era with the present one, will 
clarify the changes in Japanese security policy, fiscal policy and domestic politics incurred by 
these recent events and their relationship to the current policies taken by the Koizumi Cabinet.  
The following sections are organized as follows: section 2 provides an overview of 
Japanese security policy, fiscal policy and politics in the cold war era; section 3 presents the 
changes made in response to the Gulf War and its aftermath; section 4 provides the changes under 
the Murayama Cabinet, which includes the response to the Kobe earthquake and the Sarin 
chemical attack. This section also refers to the revision of the National Defense Program Outline 
and the establishment of the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, both of which 
summarized the changes in security policy. Section 5 presents the responses taken by the Koizumi 
Cabinet against the September 11 terrorist attack and the budget deficit, and the problems left 
unsolved. Section 6 discusses the factors that affect the future of these policies.1 
 
2. The Situation in the Cold War Era  
Most of the arguments on Japanese security policy in the cold war era had been centered 
on the Constitutional issue.  
The famous Article 9 of the Constitution states in the first paragraph: “the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as 
means of settling international disputes”, and in the second paragraph: “In order to accomplish the 
aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never 
be maintained.”  
When it was promulgated in 1946 under American occupation, the Constitution reflected 
                                                 
1 The view I present in this paper is my personal one. It has no relationship with the official view 
of the Ministry of Finance. 
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the strong intention of the occupation forces to never allow any revival of the Japanese military. 
But when the Korean War broke out in 1950, General Douglas MacArthur had to deploy his forces 
to the Korean Peninsula. To fill the power vacuum in Japan, MacArthur ordered the immediate 
establishment of the National Police Reserve, which finally developed into the Self-Defense 
Forces in 1954.   
Since then, to remain consistent with its Constitution, the Japanese government has based 
its defense policy on an interpretation of the Constitution which holds that the Constitution neither 
denies the inherent right of the nation to defend itself nor denies the possession of “the minimum 
forces necessary” to exercise this right.  
Following the end of its post war occupation, like Germany who actually revised its 
Constitution to rearm, Japanese conservatives also tried to revise the Constitution to stipulate more 
clearly the country’s rearmament. The Constitution requires a two-thirds majority vote of both 
Houses in the Diet to initiate any constitutional amendment and a majority of the national 
electorate to ratify it. So, in 1955, the Conservative prime minister Ichiro Hatoyama oversaw the 
merger of Japan’s conservative parties into a single party, called the Liberal Democratic Party, and 
dissolved the Lower House in order to win the required two-thirds majority vote. To counter this 
development, the divided opposition parties also merged into a single party, the Socialist Party. In 
the resulting election, the LDP won by a considerable margin but failed to capture the two-thirds 
majority. This is the origin of the long lasting so-called “regime 55” in which the LDP keeps 
political power and the Socialist Party behaves as a major opponent. 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations sanctions collective self defense, which is 
the right of a nation to defend its allies against attack as if an attack upon an ally were a direct 
attack upon itself. As to the article ’s impact on Japanese defense policy, the official interpretation 
of the Constitution does not deny collective self defense itself as an inherent right of the nation but 
denies the exercise of it as unconstitutional. This interpretation is still maintained now. The basic 
idea is that the use of force is allowed only as the “minimum necessary” measure to defend against 
an urgent direct attack upon the country.  In the era of “regime 55”, people did not imagine that the 
Self-Defense Forces would participate in operations overseas either in bilateral or multilateral 
cases. 
Under the restriction of the Constitution and under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, under 
which the United States substantially compensated Japan for its defense capability, Japan was able 
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to spend relatively little money on defense and to focus on economic growth.  
The secret meeting held in Washington in 1953 between Mr. Hayato Ikeda, Prime 
Minister Shigeru Yoshida’s personal envoy, and Mr.  Robertson, the U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of 
State, in which the two sides discussed Japan’s postwar rearmament policy, is an example that 
illustrates the postwar structure in which the requirements of economic growth determined the 
scale of Self-Defense Forces. According to the memoir of Kiichi Miyazawa, who attended the 
meeting in his position as Mr. Ikeda’s secretary, although the initial request from State Secretary 
John Foster Dulles had been for a Japanese ground force with over 300,000 personnel, Mr. Ikeda 
succeeded in negotiating the number of personnel down to 180,000.2 The consequence of this 
meeting, combined with the difficulty in recruiting members of young generations who have 
grown up in a postwar pacifist society into the military, was that this number of ground force 
personnel was maintained during the entire cold war era and was assumed to be “the minimum 
necessary” force consistent with the restriction of the Constitution. 
Even with a small ratio of defense spending, due to Japan’s long lasting rapid postwar 
economic growth the scale of the Self-Defense Forces expanded until 1976.  In that year, reflecting 
the change brought about in the domestic economic situation after the first oil shock and the 
changes in the international scene resulting from the first détente between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union, the scale of the defense forces was fixed at the level of 1976 by the old National Defense 
Program Outline under the Miki Cabinet.  
In the 1980s, when tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union increased again, in 
response to requests from the U.S., Japan improved the “quality” of its weapons, especially those 
weapons that were effective in defending against Soviet submarines. Tokyo also gradually took 
over the expenses of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan, under a policy, which was called the Host 
Nation Support or “Omoiyari Yosan”.  
  
With respect to fiscal policy, the Japanese government enjoyed good financial conditions 
in the first half of the cold war era and suffered from a considerable amount of budget deficits in 
the second half of this era.  
To ensure fiscal discipline, Japanese Public Finance Law allows the government to issue 
public bonds only for financing public work projects, equity participation and lending. This 
                                                 
2 See Kiichi Miyazawa. Tokyo-Washington no mitsudan. Jitsugyo-no-nihon, 1956.    
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principle is called the “construction bonds” principle. Generally, the term of the redemption of 
Japanese government bonds is 60 years. The idea is to allow the issuing of bonds only for 
acquiring assets, which also benefit future generations. Britain has the same kind of principle 
called the “golden rule”. This principle had been basically maintained during the long postwar 
period until 1975. In 1975, because of the recession caused by the first oil crisis, the Japanese 
government had to begin issuing special deficit-financing bonds to finance current non-investment 
expenditures by enacting a special law. Appendix 1 shows the trend of government bond issues 
during the last quarter century. Once allowed, the outstanding deficit-financing bonds expanded 
rapidly, and it took 15 years to reduce and eliminate the issuance of the bonds. Only with the help 
of the “bubble economy”, did the Japanese government finally succeed in eliminating the issuance 
of new deficit- financing bonds in the 1990 fiscal year, which started April 1990, just four months 
before the invasion by Iraq into Kuwait .3  
 
 
3. The Response to the Gulf War Under the Kaifu Cabinet  
 
3.1.The preceding political situation- The impact of the Consumption Tax  
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the political situation in Japan did not seem to 
be suitable for any drastic changes in policies. The invasion occurred in the aftermath of the 
dispute over the Consumption Tax, which was at the center of the partisan confrontation at the 
time. 
In April 1989, the Japanese government introduced the new Consumption Tax. It was 
packaged as part of overall tax reform with net revenue reduction by income tax cuts and the 
abolishment of old excise taxes with their distorted rates. But at the beginning, the new tax was  
unpopular among voters, especially housewives.  
Combined with the bribery scandal, which was occurring at the same time, the 
Consumption Tax contributed to the defeat of the ruling LDP in the Upper House election held in 
summer 1989. The Socialist Party, a major opponent of the new tax, put up many female 
candidates and succeeded in winning a large percentage of the housewife’s vote. The LDP lost its 
                                                 
3 For more detailed information, see Budget Bureau, Ministry of Finance, Japan. The Japanese 
Budget in Brief 2001. or http://www.mof.go.jp/english/index.htm. 
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majority in the Upper House after holding power for over 30 years in Japan’s postwar period.  
Under the Japanese Constitution, the Lower House has superiority over the Upper House 
in the selection of the prime minister, passage of the budget, and the ratification of treaties. 
Because the LDP still occupied the majority of the Lower House, it was able to keep its position in 
power under Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. However, the management of the Diet became very 
difficult because every bill other than those exceptions noted above had to be also approved by the 
Upper House.  
The Socialist Party proposed a tax reform bill which included the abolition of the 
Consumption Tax and created alternative revenue sources, which was approved by the Upper 
House. To defeat this legislation, the LDP proposed a revision of the Consumption Tax, which was 
approved by the Lower House.  
It was only in June 1990, when a conference on the treatment of the Consumption Tax 
was initiated in the Diet, that Japan’s political leaders attempted to solve this legislative impasse. 
However, the difference between the parties was so large that the future of the Consumption Tax 
was still uncertain. The partisan confrontation incurred by the tax dispute was still strong in the 
Diet when Japan, like the rest of the world, was confronted with the first serious international crisis 
of the post cold war world: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.  
 
3.2.The failed attempt to send Self Defense Forces to the Gulf 
In the fall of 1990, to make a “visible” contribution to the international coalition against 
Iraq, the Kaifu Cabinet decided to propose a bill allowing the Self-Defense Forces to participate in 
Peace Keeping Operations as well as providing logistical support for the activities of multinational 
forces operating under United Nations resolutions intended to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.  
Reflecting the divided opinions even within the government and the LDP over Japan’s 
response to the Gulf crisis, the bill had to be prepared within a short period.  
The disputes in the Diet over the bill focused on whether the proposed operations would 
not constitute “the integral part of the use of force” which is prohibited by the Constitution. The 
deliberations often came to a complete halt because the opposition parties were not satisfied with 
the explanations from the government. The media and public opinion also seemed to be divided. 
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The bill did not pass, even in the Lower House.4  
 
3.3.The beginning of the Gulf War and Japanese measures to finance the war 
When war broke out in the Gulf on January 17, 1991, Japan, which had not contributed a 
single soldier or civilian to the anti-Iraq coalition, had to devise a response to this new serious turn 
in the crisis.  
Japan had already spent two billion dollars to finance the international activities in the 
Gulf from the proceeding budget. But the situation was totally changed by the outbreak of 
hostilities. Japan pledged to pay an additional nine billion dollars to finance the Gulf War.  
The situation was urgent and nine billion dollars was too large a sum to be fully raised in 
the proceeding budget. The Japanese government decided to propose a bill to raise the nine billion 
dollars immediately by issuing bonds and to redeem them through specific revenues, including 
temporary tax increases. The tax increases were believed to be necessary to make the Japanese 
people share the “visible” pain with people in countries participating in the Gulf War as well as to 
maintain fiscal discipline.  
The issuance of the bonds was a deviation from the “construction bonds” principle. Both 
the issuance of bonds and tax increases required a special law which needed to be approved by 
both Houses.  
The initial proposal by the government and the LDP financed all of the redemption of the 
bonds by the tax increases, but the centrist parties, including the Komeito Party, strongly requested 
cutting budget expenditures. Without their cooperation, the bill could not pass the Upper House. 
The government and the LDP finally accepted the request and revised the proposal. The proposed 
tax increases were reduced.5 
                                                 
4 The dispute inside the Japanese government and in the Diet is depicted in Ryuuichi Teshima, 
1991 nen nihonno haisen, shincho-sha,1993.   
5 The final proposal was as follows. The equivalence of 9 billion dollars at that time was 1,170 
billion yen. 201.1 billion yen was raised in the 1990 budget. The residual, 968.9 billion yen was 
financed by the issuance of government bonds.  
 To redeem these bonds, the defense budget after FY 1991 was cut by 100.2 billion yen, the budget 
for the apartments for public servants in FY 1991 was cut by 0.7 billion yen, the contingency fund 
in FY 1991 was cut by 200 billion yen. The residual, 668 billion yen was financed by the 
temporary tax increases. 
 The tax increases included 440 billion yen from the special corporation tax and 228 billion yen 
from the special petroleum tax. The amounts of both taxes in the initial proposal were 590 billion 
yen and 460 billion yen. The initial proposal also included the special tobacco tax of 140 billion 
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With the cooperation from these centrist parties, the bill passed the Diet on March 6th , 
shortly after the Gulf War ended. It was the first time when non-LDP parties supported the budget 
and tax increases. In hindsight, it was the laying of the groundwork for the new coalition in the 
1990s and now.  
 
Two arguments in the Diet over the bill financing the Gulf War should be remembered:  
One was the strong request from the Diet that the payment should not be spent on 
weapons and ammunitions. It reflected the former dispute over ”the integral part of the use of 
force”.  
In hindsight, this request had only political meaning because the payment by Japan 
covered only about 20% of the total costs of the Gulf War, and the costs spent on items other than 
weapons and ammunitions were far above 20% of total costs. But this request showed the national 
reluctance in Japan toward participating in the war, even by financing the military efforts of other 
countries. 
Another argument was the debate over the relationship between he “construction bonds” 
principle and a war. The prohibition against the Bank of Japan’s directly underwriting government 
bonds has the same background. 
After the Great Depression, in the 1930s, Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi took a 
Keynesian policy of issuing government bonds underwritten by the central bank to stimulate the 
Japanese economy. Mr. Takahashi succeeded in helping the economy to recover, but after this 
success he tried to cut the military budget, which consumed almost half of the total budget, and 
was assassinated in the coup d’etat attempt by the army. His successors did not resist further 
requests from the military for continually expansion of the military budget, which ultimately led to 
hyper inflation just after the end of W.W.? .  
The idea in 1991 to issue government bonds to finance a war reminded the Japanese 




                                                                                                                                                             
yen but it was dropped from the final proposal. (As to the total scheme, see Kunino yosan 1991, 
Public Finance Study Group in the Budget Bureau, Ministry of Finance, Japan. As to the tax 
scheme, see Kaiseizeihou no subete 1991, Ookurazaimukyoukai.) 
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3.4.The sequel of the Gulf War-the compromise on the Consumption Tax, minesweepers, 
PKO, the way to the new coalition  
The first dividend of the new political situation was reaped in tax policy. The conference 
on the treatment of the Consumption Tax reached a bipartisan agreement including all major 
parties except the Communist Party to revise the tax as a reform for the present and the bill was 
approved by both Houses in May 1991.6 
When the Gulf War was over, the newly restored government of Kuwait made a public 
notice of gratitude to countries contributing to the liberation of its territory through the placement 
of advertisements in major U.S. newspapers. The list included the names of 30 countries to which 
Kuwait was grateful, Japan was not on this list. This oversight was widely reported by the media, 
and it left many Japanese feeling disappointed that their contribution to the war had been 
overlooked.7 
After the Gulf War was over, there was room for Self-Defense Forces to be deployed in 
the Gulf even within the restrictions of the conventional laws because there was no longer a 
possibility they would be involved in “the use of force”. The Japanese government deployed 
minesweepers belonging to the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Gulf. Because they were 
deployed so late, the minesweepers had to deal with the most difficult part of searching for  
underwater mines during the hottest season in the Gulf. Though the minesweepers were the 
smallest ships that the Maritime Self-Defense Force had, their deployment became the most 
publicly evaluated activity of Japan relating to the Gulf War. 
The next chance to demonstrate the Japanese contribution to  the international community 
came in 1992 when the long-running civil war in Cambodia finally ended and the need for Peace 
Keeping Operations in that war-torn Southeast Asian nation became clear. Based on the new 
political coalition formed at the time of the Gulf War, the Japanese government under the 
Miyazawa Cabinet succeeded in passing the bill allowing the participation of the Self Defense 
Forces in PKO.  
But because of the continuing concern over the Constitution’s prohibition against the use 
                                                 
6 The revision included the addition of tax exempt to some goods and services in the fields of 
welfare, education and the like, the new tax exempt for house rents, and the reform of special 
treatments for small traders. 
 
7 See Teshima, 1993.   
 
 11
of force, the activities of the Self-Defense Forces were restricted. Activities which might have 
necessitated the use of weapons, such as policing a cease-fire, stationing and patrolling in a buffer 
zone, searching at a checkpoint, and overseeing the collection, custody and disposal of abandoned 
weapons and the like were suspended until the suspension was lifted by another law in the future. 
The activities in which the Self-Defense Forces could participate were still limited to logistical 
support and humanitarian relief. With the same concern, the use of weapons was strictly restricted 
to the case of legitimate self-defense and emergency evacuation, which was narrower than the 
international standard.  
The new political situation made the former opposition parties to more positively 
participate in policy-making. It paved a way to the non-LDP coalition government under Prime 
Minister Hosokawa in 1993. 
 
4.The Changes under the Murayama Cabinet (1994-1996) 
The Non-LDP coalition government lasted less than one year. The LDP succeeded in 
coming back to power by supporting its long- lasting rival, the Socialist Mr. Tomiichi Murayama. 
The Murayama Cabinet was the final end of “regime 55” and in hindsight, impacted greatly on 
both security policy and fiscal policy in Japan. 
When he came to power, PM Murayama had to declare the drastic change of stance of his 
own party on two major political issues, the approval of the Self-Defense Forces and the 
Consumption Tax. During his term in office, PM Murayama even made a decision to raise the 
Consumption Tax rate in exchange  
for income tax cuts8 and revised the National Defense Program Outline after almost 20 years. Two 
major catastrophic events, which are major topics of this paper, also occurred during his term.  
 
4.1.The impact of the earthquake in Kobe  
In the early morning of January 17, 1995, a significant earthquake occurred beneath the 
streets of the central Japanese city of Kobe. 
As in New York following the terrorist attack of September 11, the earthquake in Kobe 
                                                 
8 The tax reform bill proposed by the Murayama Cabinet in October 1994 and approved by the 
Diet in November 1994 included the income tax reduction starting from CY 1994 and the tax 
increase of Consumption Tax starting from April 1997. The tax increase was implemented under 
the Hashimoto Cabinet. 
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cut off telephone communications between that city and the rest of the world. Consequently, there 
was no information in Tokyo about the severity of the damage in the critical hours immediately 
following the earthquake. It was only several hours later when pictures from helicopters chartered 
by the media began to appear on TV that people in Tokyo realized the seriousness of the disaster. 
The TV footage projected a shocking scene of overturned highways and collapsed buildings.  
The epicenter of the quake was just below the city. Because of this, the victims in Kobe 
came mainly from damaged buildings, not from fires, differentiating the effect of this earthquake 
from other major earthquakes in Japan’s past. A considerable number of victims were buried alive 
and died before they could be rescued. The number of casualties finally amounted to over 6,000.9 
Same as occurred in the United States after September 11th, the Kobe earthquake brought 
out some virtues of postwar Japanese society. Survivors in Kobe were patient, behaved in good 
order and cooperated with each other. There were hardly any crimes exploiting the situation. As 
one of the biggest ports in Japan, Kobe had a good number of large ethnic communities in the city. 
There was no bad behavior against these people. The activities of volunteer groups, especially 
those comprising members of younger generations, were so prominent that people’s image of these 
groups totally changed. 
But, just as the September 11 attack exposed serious shortcomings in America’s 
intelligence system and homeland security structure, the Kobe earthquake revealed some major 
defects of crisis management in the Japanese government. There were two major lessons drawn 
from the event; one was the importance of the concentration and management of information to 
support the prime minister’s decision, another was the importance of the role of the Self-Defense 
Forces in catastrophic events and that of the quick deployment of those forces.  
 
The Murayama Cabinet was severely criticized for its delayed response to the Kobe 
earthquake. 
The Disaster Prevention Bureau in the National Land Agency was the first government 
agency to receive blame. But the Bureau’s basic mission was the ex ante planning of the 
prevention of disasters and the size of its staff numbered only about 30 persons. They had no 
original sources of information and no statutory authority to order other agencies to act. Everybody 
                                                 
9 According to the count by the Fire Defense Agency, the number was 6,308 as of December 27, 
1995.   
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demanded so much from the Bureau staff in the immediate aftermath of the quake and they went 
beyond their capacity very quickly.   
The local fire and police authorities had much on-site information and manpower, and 
their situation could be relayed to the prime minister. But there was no crisis management 
specialist in the prime minister’s office who could analyze the information as it was received and 
report it to the prime minister in an organized way.  
In the case of Kobe, the TV pictures taken from helicopters were an extremely important 
source of information for government officials on the damage which had occurred. However, there 
were no Japanese government agencies with TV cameras which could be placed in helicopters 
with the footage relayed directly back to Tokyo by electrical transmission. In addition, the 
infrastructure of information in the prime minister’s office was also poor. 
Another lesson drawn from Kobe was the importance of the role of the Self-Defense 
Forces in catastrophic events and that of the quick deployment of the forces.  
In Kobe’s case, because the transportation as well as the on-site supply of water, gas, 
electricity, telecommunications and other utilities had been stopped, the rescuers needed to be 
highly self-sufficient. 
The interruption of transportation prevented most of the city government workers who 
commuted in from suburban areas from reaching the city.  The fire and police authorities 
functioned relatively well from the beginning but they were short of the tools and machines 
necessary for rescue activities. The authorities in neighboring cities and prefectures also came to 
help in rescue activities, but because they could not expect to be supplied with food, water and fuel 
in Kobe, they often took extra time preparing for these shortages, delaying their arrival in the city. 
The organization that was most self-sufficient and had the largest capacity for rescue 
activities in the affected neighborhoods was the Division of Ground Self-Defense Force. The 
Kansai area, which includes Kobe, has had a longer history as a political capital than Tokyo, and 
traditionally has had a relatively strong anti-central government feeling in general and an uneasy 
relationship with the Self-Defense Forces, but this view changed overnight.  
But at first, the response of the force was slow. Consequently, the Division became 
another target of criticism. The conventional law required the explicit request from the governor of 
the prefecture for the dispatch of troops and because of the interruption of communications, the 
request was significantly delayed and so as a result was the dispatch of the force. This system also 
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reflected the bad memory of the coup d’etat attempt in the 1930s which paved the way to the 
military dominance in prewar Japanese politics.  
 
With respect to these points, major improvements have since been realized in Japan’s 
natural disaster response policy.  
Helicopters equipped with electronically transmitted TV camera systems were supplied 
to many government authorities by the supplementary budget.  
Under the new law amended soon after the earthquake, the Self-Defense Forces can be 
dispatched for rescue operations during times of disaster without the request from the governor in 
cases of emergency.  
The reform of the central government which was realized last year strengthened the prime 
minister’s office considerably. There now exists a vice minister class official who specializes in 
crisis management attached to the prime minister ’s office. 
The new prime minister’s office building which will be completed this year will have 
much better technology for information functions.  
 
The Kobe earthquake also affected Japanese fiscal policy.  
The budget response for the recovery and the reconstruction of the city seemed to work 
relatively well compared with previous stages of responses by the government. Because of many 
precedents of disasters in Japan, there were many established systems of spending to support 
victims and subsidize the recovery and reconstruction efforts. In addition, a special minister in 
charge of reconstruction was appointed, and under his coordination, special measures such as 
special high rates of subsidies, special low interest loans, and special tax treatments were realized. 
The first supplementary budget mainly for initial recovery passed the Die t in February, just the 
next month after the disaster. The expenditures of the original budget of the coming fiscal year 
starting in April were concentrated on Kobe reconstruction efforts at the implementation level and 
another supplementary budget for reconstruction also passed the Diet in May.  
 
The main problem was the long term.  
It was the first case of the issuance of special deficit- financing bonds without specific 
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revenue for redemption since 199010.  
It was also the first time in postwar history that an annual defense budget was increased 
by a supplementary budget11. The defense spending is never thought to be a “constructive” 
expenditure, which Japanese Public Finance Law allows to be financed by issuing public bonds.   
 Furthermore, because authority over the defense budget is considered to be key for 
civilian control over the military, there had been a fixed idea that it should not be changed in a short 
time on the occasion of supplementary budget.  
These changes might contribute to a more flexible allocation of resources. But the fact 
that even the defense budget could be increased by a supplementary budget inevitably encouraged 
other constituencies to request more distribution of the budget for their needs.  
Considering the catastrophic nature of the Kobe earthquake, it was inevitable that fiscal 
discipline would have to be temporarily eased. But as Appendix 1 shows, once the principle was 
broken, the issuance of government bonds expanded rapidly.  
  
4.2.The Sarin chemical attack on Tokyo subway lines  
Two months after the Kobe earthquake, on the morning of March 20, 1995, the Sarin 
chemical attack on Tokyo subway lines took place. Twelve persons were killed and thousands of 
others suffered from the Sarin gas.  
The culprits were members of the religious cult group called “AUM Supreme Truth”, led 
by the self-styled “guru” Shoukou Asahara. 
When the attack occurred, the victims even did not know the cause of their suffering. The 
cause was identified as Sarin on the same day, but people still did not know who committed the 
                                                 
10 Since 1990, special deficit-financing bonds had been issued twice but both of them had had 
some specific revenue for redemption. One was to finance the Gulf War as I already mentioned, 
and another was to finance the income tax cuts determined in late 1994, the previous year.  
 In the latter case, the bonds were issued to finance the temporary revenue reduction between 
income tax cuts starting in 1994 and the scheduled Consumption Tax rise starting in 1997 and 
were scheduled to be redeemed by the net tax revenue after 1997. Because the margin of net tax 
revenue was relatively small, the term of redemption was scheduled to be 20 years, much longer 
than that of Gulf War case, but a kind of fiscal discipline was still maintained in the scheme.  
 
11 From the perspective of civilian control, Japanese government has had a specific framework to 
limit the amount of defense budget since 1976. From 1976 to 1986, there had been the ceiling that 
the annual defense budget was limited within 1 percent of GNP. Since 1987, there has been the 
ceiling that the sum of the defense budget in 5 years of mid-term plan is limited within the 
amount of the mid-term plan. The increase of the defense spending by supplementary budget is 
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attack.  
Two days later, on the morning of March 22nd , the police raid of the AUM facilities, 
located on the skirts of Mt. Fuji, started.  
As with the Kobe earthquake, the chemical attack against civilians showed the important 
role of Self-Defense Forces in catastrophic events. Only the Ground Self-Defense Force had 
specialists, equipment and knowledge in this field. This time, based on an official request from the 
governor, they were dispatched to the contaminated subway lines. With full cooperation from the 
Ground Self-Defense Force, the police authorities were able to start their investigation.  
Because the structure of the AUM facilities was like a labyrinth, the investigation took 
many weeks. During this tense time, rumors of the next attack circulated everywhere. Many 
hoaxes took place in public places.  
The Japanese government was on the highest alert. The supplementary budget in May 
was drawn up to include the expenditures necessary to tighten the nation’s internal defenses 
against the next potential attack. It was the first time that emergency anti-crime expenditures 
became a pillar of a supplementary budget. 
The police investigation gradually revealed the scope of the secret activities of AUM. 
One of the AUM facilities was found to be a factory for the manufacture of Sarin gas. It was in 
May when Mr. Asahara was discovered in the facility and arrested. The rumored next attack never 
happened. People finally regained peace of mind.  
This event demonstrated some of the virtues of public and private sector workers, 
especially Tokyo subway workers, who unselfishly put themselves at risk in rescue activities. But 
it also revealed many defects of the Japanese law enforcement system. Because most of these 
defects were based on characteristics of Japanese postwar society itself, it proved to be more 
difficult to fix them in the short run.  
As an open democratic society like the U.S., Japan has the same vulnerability against 
terrorist attacks. In addition, as a reaction to the prewar militarism, the Japanese people are very 
reluctant to give the government authority which has any potential to violate human rights. Even if 
given authority, the government agency in charge often refrains from full use of it to avoid 
criticism.  
The Ministry of Education, which was formally in charge of supervising religious 
                                                                                                                                                             
also subject to this ceiling.  
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corporations, had done little with the AUM group in general before the attack.  
Before the Sarin attack, the AUM group had made a failed attempt to produce and 
distribute anthrax. This had led to trouble with AUM’s neighbors because of a nasty smell 
resulting from the test, but the local police authorities had refrained from intervening because they 
could  find no clear evidence of crimes at that time. 
Based on the postwar reforms, Japanese police authorities are segmented prefecture by 
prefecture. The original reform by the U.S. created municipal police departments but because of 
their inability to deal with vicious crimes in the early 1950s, they were merged into prefectural 
police agencies. The National Police Agency has the authority to distribute a part of the national 
budget to prefectural agencies and to appoint top officials of the prefectural police departments but 
it traditionally did not have authority to command individual criminal investigations except in 
some limited cases. 
Segmented investigations between prefectural police authorities sometimes caused 
problems that hindered law enforcement efforts. In the AUM case, before the subway attack in 
Tokyo, the AUM group kidnapped and killed the entire family of an anti-AUM lawyer in the 
neighboring prefecture and even killed 7 people by Sarin gas in another neighboring prefecture but 
both of these crimes had remained unsolved. In the latter case, the prefectural police authority 
consistently kept another person under suspicion, who finally turned out to be a victim of AUM. 
Poor intelligence is also characteristic of the Japanese government.  
Since 1952 Japan has the Subversive Activities Prevention Act and the Public Security 
Investigation Agency. The Act gives the Agency statutory authority to investigate subversive 
organizations and, when necessary, the power to request the dissolution of them.  
But the investigation authority of the Agency is limited to a voluntary basis and the 
Agency has no compulsory power such as the police authorities have. Because the application of 
the Act had been based on the cold war paradigm and the manpower of the Agency had been 
relatively small, the Agency had historically focused on the activities of radical leftist groups and, 
until 1995, had never requested the dissolution of any organizations.  
After the Sarin attack, the AUM religious corporation was dissolved by the court order. 
The Public Security Investigation Agency requested the dissolution, which meant the prohibition 
of assembly for Japanese citizens for the first time in postwar history. The anti-terrorism special 
teams which are trained and have special equipment against terrorism were established in the 
 18
police. 
But the Public Security Examination Commission, the independent commission who has 
authority to rule on the dissolution of private organizations, rejected the Agency’s request to 
dissolve AUM in 1997.  
Only in 1999 was a new law enacted to control the activities of organizations that were 
responsible for committing indiscriminate mass murders in the past, giving the Public Security 
Investigation Agency new authority to investigate and impose some controls on groups such as 
AUM.12 
Some progress was also made recently. New laws enacted in 2000 strengthened the 
punishment against organized crimes and allowed investigation authorities to intercept electric 
communications in cases involving organized crimes, drugs, gun crimes and mass stowaways. The 
National Police Agency’s right to command prefectural police authorities was also expanded in 
1996 and again in 200013.  
 
4.3.The revision of the National Defense Program Outline  
The revision of the National Defense Program Outline which was made by the Murayama 
Cabinet in the same year as the Sarin attack, (November 28, 1995), clearly showed the changes in 
defense policy based on the situation this paper has already covered.14  
The Outline is a combination of the description of the principles of defense policy and the 
annexed table that defines a concrete scale of Self Defense Forces.15 
As to the international situation, the new Outline recognizes the ”demise” of the 
“confrontation between East and West”, but also cites “new kinds of dangers”, including the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and complicated and diverse regional conflicts.  
As to the required role of defense capability, it explicitly mentions “response to 
                                                 
12 The chronological table about the events relating to the “AUM Supreme Truth” is shown in 
http://www.npa.go.jp (the Web site of the National Police Agency). The introduction of the Public 
Security Investigation Agency is shown in http://www.moj.go.jp (the Web site of the Ministry of 
Justice) . 
13 The right to command was expanded to organized crimes of wide area in 1996 and to the cases 
seriously relate to international relations and national interests in 2000. 
14 For more details about the background of the new Outline, see Takafumi Sato. Shin Bouei 
Taikou, Shin Chuukibou to Heisei 8 Nendo Boueiyosan. Finance April-May 
1996 ,Ookurazaimukyoukai 
15 For the full version of the National Defense Program Outline, see http://jda.go.jp (the Web site 
of the Defense Agency)  
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large-scale disasters” and “contribution to efforts for international peace” as well as “national 
defense”.  
The Outline consequently places the restructuring of Japan’s defense capabilities in the 
context of these changes and the country’s serious fiscal situation. Maintaining the basic idea of 
“minimum necessary” capability, it calls for Japan’s defense forces to have more ”compact” 
capability on the one hand, while calling for “enhancing necessary functions” on the other hand. In 
a word, the main idea of the restructuring was the creation of a smaller but more workable Self 
Defense Forces.  
The personnel quota of Ground Self-Defense Force is a typical example of how the 
Outline tries to create a smaller but more workable force under the new situation. Although the 
180,000 personnel number arrived at in Washington back in 1953 had long been an “inviolable 
number”, it had never been filled because of the difficulty in recruiting members of the postwar 
generations into the armed forces. The actual number of real personnel had been 150,000 or 
160,000 at best.  
Japan’s continuing serious fiscal situation and the rapid aging of the population will make 
the situation worse. This personnel shortfall might prevent the Self-Defense Force from operating 
at full capacity, but it was not considered a fundamental threat to national security because in the 
cold war era, there was never an imminent threat of actual armed conflict. It was assumed that any 
actual hostilities would occur after a period of deteriorating relations between the superpowers, 
allowing time for an adequate defensive build-up. But in the post cold war era, the personnel 
shortage would threaten to undermine the SDF’s ability to participate in PKO, respond to 
large-scale disasters, or deal with “new kinds of dangers” such as biological or chemical weapons 
attacks, when the response would have to be immediate, with no time for preparation, although the 
scale of these operations are presumed smaller than those of assumed combat scenarios in the cold 
war era. 
In order to fulfill these expected requirements, the new Outline reduced the number of the 
regular personnel to 145,000 but at the same time strengthened the ready reserve personnel to 
15,000. The regular personnel forces would be fully activated at very beginning of any future 
security crisis and the reserve personnel forces would join the operation within a short interval of 
time.  
In the political context, the “smaller” force was appealing to the Socialist Party , while the 
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“workable” force appealed to the LDP. 
 The new Outline also deals with the diversified role of Japan-U.S. security arrangements.  
Security arrangements between the two countries are positioned as “playing a key role in 
achieving peace and stability in the surrounding region of Japan”. The Host Nation Support is 
positioned explicitly as a necessary effort to enhance the security arrangements between Japan and 
the United States. In short, it argues the Japan-U.S. security arrangements act as a “public good” 
for the region surrounding Japan and stresses the positive meaning of the Host Nation Support, 
which contributes to this “public good”.  
The most controversial issue of the new Outline at that time was the new description of 
the response to “a situation in areas surrounding Japan”. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula were 
increasing at that time and the major concern of defense specialists in both countries was the extent 
to which Japan could support U.S. forces in the event of possible combat on the Korean Peninsula.  
As to cooperation in the case of aggression against Japan, the Guideline was established 
in 1978. The new Outline endorsed the start of the study of new Guidelines, including for the areas 
surrounding Japan. 
 
4.4. Some changes after the Murayama Cabinet 
This study resulted in the new Guideline established in 1997 and the relevant laws which 
were passed by the Diet in 1999. The standard of “not constitut ing the integral part of the use of 
force” was maintained. Clarified activities covered most of the activities in the “rear area” except 
the supply of weapons and ammunitions. The “rear area” was defined as including the high seas 
and international airspace around Japan, which were distinguished from areas where actual 
combats operations were being conducted. The concept of ”a situation in areas surrounding Japan” 
would be not geographic but situational.  
The fact that the new Outline was drafted by the Murayama cabinet was politically 
important because it formed a bipartisan consensus, including all major political parties except the 
Communist Party, on the basic principles of defense policy.  
After the Murayama Cabinet, in the reshuffle of political parties, a large part of the 
members of the former Socialist Party merged into the new Democratic Party.   One major 
component of “regime 55” finally disappeared. 
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5.The Changes Under the Koizumi Cabinet 
 
5.1.The response to the terrorist attack 
This paper will now study the response of the Koizumi cabinet to the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi responded quickly to the crisis, 
demonstrating leadership in support of the U.S. in the aftermath of the attack. PM Koizumi visited 
New York on September 24, 2001, personally viewed ground zero, and held a press conference 
with New York State Governor George Pataki and then-New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani 
before meeting with President George W. Bush in Washington on September 25th.  
 
5.1.a. The enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act and the following 
deployment of Self-Defense Forces   
The most important part of PM Koizumi’s response to the events of September 11 was the 
enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act and the resulting deployment of 
Self-Defense Forces.16 
As this paper has already mentioned, the succession of crises over the past ten years 
provided a context of favorable conditions for PM Koizumi’s proposals, conditions PM Kaifu did 
not have when the Gulf crisis occurred. 
There already had been many precedents of dispatching Self-Defense Forces overseas in 
peace time as a PKO force. There was an established Guideline on corporation with U.S. forces in 
the cases which included the situation in the area surrounding Japan. 
In the Diet, there was a wide range of political support for the positive role of 
Self-Defense Forces as long as it was within the restrictions of the Constitution.  
The public and the media also had become much more conscious of the importance of 
crisis management and the importance of the role of Self-Defense Forces.  
In addition, over 20 Japanese citizens were actually killed in the World Trade Center 
attack and the idea that this attack was a challenge to modern civilization was widely shared by the 
Japanese people.    
Working in the political context of these conditions, PM Koizumi succeeded in the first 
deployment of the Self-Defense Forces overseas in war time within less than 2 months after the 
                                                 
16 For the full text of the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Act and the Basic Plan, see 
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September 11th attacks. Following the conventional argument over the use of force, explicitly 
connecting the response to the terrorist attacks that took place on September 11th , and limiting the 
term of the bill to two years, PM Koizumi was able to minimize the opposition in the Diet.   
The Anti-terrorism Act allows Self-Defense Forces to implement logistical support to 
foreign forces, with the exception of supplying weapons and ammunitions and the like, and to 
provide assistance to affected people. The act covers almost the same range of operations as the 
case of the situations in areas surrounding Japan. The implementation of this support is limited by 
the act to areas in which combat is not taking place or not expected to take place. 
The act allows for activities in the territory of foreign countries for the first time on the 
condition of consent from the territorial countries. The new act also expands the use of weapons to 
protect the lives of those who are with the Self-Defense Forces and have come under SDF control 
while conducting the ir duties.  
The amendments in the Diet required legislative approval of the Basic Plan, which 
specifies the activities of Self Defense Forces within twenty days after their launch. The 
Democratic Party, which is the largest opposition party and whose leader, Yukio Hatoyama, is a 
grandson of former conservative Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama, basically supported the 
deployment of Self-Defense Forces. It did not vote for the act because of the complications 
surrounding the negotiations over the amendments, but it voted for the Basic Plan. 
The act passed the Diet on October 29th and the first deployment of the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force started on November 9th. The Basic plan includes logistical support by the 
Maritime and Air Self-  Defense Forces in the area including the Indian Ocean and assistance to the 
affected people by the Maritime Self-Defense Force in the area including the territory of Pakistan.  
This breakthrough was followed by another decision in security policy.  
Following the new agreement between ruling coalition parties, the law was amended to 
lift the suspension of certain PKO activities since 1992 and to allow Self-Defense Force officials 
the same standard of the use of weapons as the Anti-Terrorism act.17  
 
5.1.b.Other measures 
It should also be noted that even before the deployment of the Self-Defense Forces, Japan 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.kantei.go.jp ( the Web site of the Prime Minister’s Office) 
17 For the full text of the amendment, see http://www.kantei.go.jp (the Web site of the prime 
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contributed much material and logistical support to the U.S. response to the terrorist attacks 
through the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The U.S. aircraft carrier which is being used as the 
platform of air attacks on the Taliban has its base in Yokosuka, and two-thirds of the marines 
deployed overseas are stationed in Okinawa. As the new Outline rightly pointed out, Japan’s 
support functions as a “public good” for a wide range of regions. The Host Nation Support 
amounts to 5 to 6 billion dollars annually in recent years, by far the largest amount among the U.S. 
allies. 
Japan also took domestic measures against terrorist attacks and gave diplomatic and 
financial support for the new government in Afghanistan and for Pakistan.  
Terrorist assets were frozen in concert with the U.S. action18. To counter any possible 
terrorist attack on Japanese domestic targets, an amendment of the law was enacted to allow the 
Self-Defense Forces to guard both their bases and those of U.S. forces on Japanese soil .  
As a developed country that has no imperialistic intentions in the affected region, Japan 
can play an important diplomatic role. Japan has also contributed additional financial support to 
the affected people in Afghanistan and the government of Pakistan19.  
As for the reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan, Japan hosted a ministerial meeting 
in Tokyo on the 21st and 22nd of this January, where it pledged to contribute up to 500 million 
dollars over the next two and a half years.  
 
5.1.c. Problems left unsolved  
Despite all the gains addressed in this paper, there remain serious problems left unsolved 
in Japanese security policy.  
Mr. Koizumi declared at a press conference on New Year’s day that he would discuss and 
enact emergency defense legislation during this Diet session. This is the legislation necessary for 
actual national defense.  
It was in 1977 when the study of emergency defense legislation started, breaking a 
long- lasting political taboo. The study has already clarified many problems to be addressed. 
Transportation of forces, use of private lands, medical treatments are among the examples. But 
                                                                                                                                                             
minister’s office). 
18 For the measures taken by the Ministry of Finance, see http://www.mof.go.jp. 
19 The specific measures published by the Japanese government on November 16, 2001 included 
36.85 million dollars to assist internally displaced people in Afghanistan and 300 million dollars 
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there has been no political will to address these problems through legislation so far, because it 
would inevitably encompass a debate on the trade-off between people’s rights and the need for 
security. Under the new, post-September 11 environment, the range of problems to be examined 
will expand even more.   
PM Koizumi’s priority seems to be timely, because there still exists  great uncertainty 
surrounding Japan’s security,  which was illustrated by the event of the suspicious unidentified boat 
which deeply violated the territorial waters of Japan and sunk after an exchange of fire with the 
Maritime Safety Agency (the Japanese Coast Guard) last December.  
The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act is a temporary measure focusing on the 
terrorist attack on September 11th. The permanent commitment to international military operations 
is another major problem to be solved. If Japanese security policy goes further than the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, the review of the standard of “not constitut ing the integral part of the use of 
force” will be inevitable.  
The choice would be between two directions in policy. One direction would be a bilateral 
approach such as allowing the exercise of collective self defense in concert with the U.S.  The 
other direction would be a multilateral approach, such as a new form of participation in military 
actions initiated by the United Nations.  
Different from Article 9, the preamble of the Constitution seems more positive to the 
concept of Japan contributing to activities undertaken by the international community. Whether to 
change the interpretation of the Constitution or to change the Constitution itself would be another 
decision.  
 
5.2.The fiscal policy 
Compared with his splendid performance in security issues, PM Koizumi’s stance on 
fiscal policy seems to be controversial at home and abroad, especially in the U.S.  
But after the long period of ineffective fiscal stimulus and the waste of public money 
accompanying it, Japanese people seem to be have grown tired of the conventional policy. As was 
already mentioned, the fiscal condition rapidly got worse in this decade, especially since 
1994-1995.   
It goes without saying that part of the reason for the current bad fiscal condition is a 
                                                                                                                                                             
of grant aid over next 2 years to assist Pakistani government. 
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cyclical factor. But the expansion of spending and the tax cuts in the name of fiscal stimulus must 
also have substantially contributed. Appendix 2 shows the trends of General Account tax revenues, 
total expenditures, and government bond issues. If we compare 2002 with 1990 just before the 
Gulf War, the tax revenue drastically decreased from 60.1 trillion yen in 1990 to 46.8 trillion yen in 
200220, while even the stagnant nominal GDP grew from 450.5 trillion to 496.2 trillion in the same 
period. On the other hand, the total expenditure expanded from 69.3 trillion to 81.2 trillion. 
 
6.Concluding Comments 
This paper has followed the changes in security policy,  fiscal policy, and politics resulting 
from the post cold war crises, and the impact of these crises on the improvement, or 
“normalization”, of Japanese security policy.  These crises heavily influenced the changes in the 
balance of power in the political world, ignited the collapse of “regime 55” and helped bring about 
the new coalition between political parties. They also triggered the deterioration of fiscal 
discipline. 
Where should Japan go from here? It is difficult to have a clear answer now.  
As to the fiscal policy, considering Japan’s rapid aging society, it is obvious that the 
current situation will not be sustainable in the long run. The problem must be the timing and the 
extent of tightening the fiscal discipline in the short run under the current stagnant economic 
conditions. 
The security policy will be more uncertain. The international situation in the region 
surrounding Japan must be a main factor in defense policy decisions. The understanding of 
neighboring countries about the changes in Japan’s defense posture should also be considered. 
When it comes to this issue, we cannot but help compare our situation to that of Germany 
after reunification. But, unlike Germany’s geopolitical situation in Europe, the region surrounding 
Japan consists of much more heterogeneous countries, including a number of countries possessing 
nuclear weapons, and the historically-based suspicions of neighboring countries regarding Japan’s 
intentions has not been completely wiped out. The United States will continue to play a vital role in 
maintaining stability in the region. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements should be maintained 
as a “public good” of this region. If Japan wants to play a more positive role in the international 
                                                 
20 The permanent reductions of income tax and corporation tax starting from 1999 had no 
offsetting revenues. The tax revenue in 2000 and 2001 increased temporarily by the tax on 
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community, its policymakers should not ignore these basic geopolitical factors. 
Another factor also should not be ignored. It is the preparedness of Japanese people for 
the shifts in public attitudes any major changes in Japan’s defense and foreign policies will 
necessarily bring about.   
In this writer ’s view, the atmosphere of postwar Japanese society is to some extent similar 
to that of the U.S. and Britain after W.W.? . 
The first time this writer had such an idea was when he read some works by F. Scott 
Fitzgerald several years ago. After W.W.I, the U.S. reverted back to isolationism very quickly and 
did not enter the League of Nations, although the League was established based on President 
Woodrow Wilson’s idea. This writer believes Fitzgerald represented very well the atmosphere of 
this era in his fiction.  
Terumasa Nakanishi, who has written many books on the history of the British Empire, 
depicts British society after W.W.? very critically.  According to Nakanishi’s books, having 
experienced many “vices” of war during W.W.? , British people focused on living a life of 
pleasure in the 1920s and 1930s, and avoided taking responsibility in world affairs although it was 
still necessary for the world order.  
The examples of the “vices” of war Nakanishi cites in the British case during W.W.? are 
impressively similar to those of Japan in W.W.? . So many people killed in vain because of stupid 
commanders. So many lies made by the government. So many negative consequences in the lives 
of people on the home front.  
History shows that these prevalent attitudes among the United States and Great Britain 
following W.W.I helped to allow the rise of Nazism and the catastrophic results of W.W.? . The 
diplomatic and military mistakes of Munich and Pearl Harbor21 are remembered as examples 
never to be repeated. One lesson from W.W.?  for people in both countries is that one should not 
hesitate to use force when it is necessary to defend democracy.  
This lesson seems to be commonly shared by people, especially political leaders in both 
                                                                                                                                                             
the lump sum payments of interests on 10 year-term Postal Saving deposits.           
21 As to the comparison between the terrorist attack on September 11 th and the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, it should be noted that the attack on Pearl Harbor was the fight between combatants and 
was totally different from the terrorist attack.  But we can not deny the importance of Pearl 
Harbor, which brought the irreversible changes in the U.S. society.  
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Anglo-Saxon countries. The views expressed by both candidates in the second Presidential debate 
between Mr. Bush and then-Vice President Al Gore in 2000 is an example.  
On the other hand, Japanese people, fortunately or unfortunately, did not experienced 
W.W.? at the public level. For them, W.W.? was their first direct experience of total warfare in the 
modern age. While they came to understand so seriously the “vices” of war as people in the U.S. 
and Britain did after W.W.? , they did not experience the same lesson as people in the U.S. and 
Britain did after W.W.? . 
The historical process in which Japan developed its current democratic system also 
affected the people’s attitudes and beliefs. Throughout Japanese history, most of the political rights 
and democratic systems have been handed down by somebody in authority - in the prewar period, 
by the government as a favor from the Emperor, in the postwar period, by the U.S. occupation 
forces. The common thread has been the lack of grass-roots activism to obtain liberty. Basically, 
Japanese people have not had to fight for their democracy.  
In the U.S. after September 11th, the word “sacrifice” has been used for an impressive 
positive effect in political discourse and American society. The lack of historical experience to 
sacrifice for democracy in Japan tends to lead to the unlimited emphasis on people’s lives and their 
rights. It has prevented any tough decisions in times of crises by the Japanese government which 
might impinge on the lives and rights of the Japanese people. 
If we go further than the Anti-Terrorism Act by either changing the interpretation of the 
Constitution or changing the Constitution itself, it will inevitably demand tougher decisions by the 
government and people as to the basic obligations of citizens to their society and Japan’s basic 
obligations as a member of the international community.  
As to the terrorist attacks on September 11th, there was a clear distinction between what 
was right and what was evil. So it was relatively easy to get consensus among Japanese people 
about the response to the attacks. But it is still questionable if Japanese people are well prepared 
for the future challenges. The emergency defense legislation must be a primary test of people’s 
preparedness for “sacrifice”. 
The fiscal policy of PM Koizumi can also be interpreted within this context. After a 
decade of stagnation, people seem to realize that they cannot achieve new growth in the long run 
without “sacrificing” old vested interests in the short run.  
As many critics pointed out, there may be risks about the future of the Koizumi Cabinet. 
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We should continue to be very cautious about the direction of the economy. We also should be 
careful about the direction of the people’s will and the unstable international situation. But this 
time can be a historic opportunity for Japan to build a healthier society and assume its proper role 
in the international community.  
 
 
 
 
